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Can it ever be morally appropriate for a physician to treat a patient
professionally by inducing a lethal agent into his or her body? Or, to
put that question generally, can the direct and immediate termination
of a patient's life ever be a morally appropriate mode of treatment in
the practice of medicine? The professional oaths, declarations, and
official statements made throughout the long history of medicine
indicate that the consistent public response of many physicians to the
question has been negative. 1 The Hippocratic Oath, for example,
states rather explicitly that the physician will not give a deadly drug to
any patient. 2 A similar statement on this point was made recently by
the House of Delegates of the American Medical Association.
The intentional termination of the life of one human being by anothermercy killing - is contrary to that for which the medical profession stands
and is contrary to the policy of the American Medical Association.

One of the most significant reasons for the long-standing opposition
of the medical profession to patient termination would seem to be the
apparent incompatibility between its humane goals and any kind of
treatment which directly causes death. Preserving health and combatting or controlling disease have always been included among those
goals, but death is the ultimate term of a diseased and unhealthy state.
Thus, it appears that a physician would be acting contrary to the
interests of his profession were he to induce a lethal agent into a
patient's body.
Yet, despite the unambiguous public stance of the medical profession on patient termination, the question raised about it at the beginning of this paper is currently a concern in medical ethics because of
the interest that has developed in recent years, particularly among
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some specialists in that field, in having active euthanasia listed among
the morally appropriate forms of patient treatment. 3 These ethicists
admit that preservation of health and control of disease are proper
professional goals of medicine, but they deny that any incompatibility necessarily exists between these goals and a physician's act of
injecting a lethal agent into a patient's body. Two principal arguments
have been advanced in recent philosophical literature to support this
contention. In the first of these to be considered in the paper, the
argument develops by showing the lack of a moral distinction between
withholding or withdrawing life support or terminal disease-controlling therapy from a patient, thereby allowing the patient to die,
and actively putting a patient to death. Based upon the lack of this
distinction and the admission generally made by the medical profession, as well as by the public community, that it is moral at times for a
physician to withhold or withdraw life support or terminal diseasecontrolling therapy for humane reasons, the argument then concludes
that it can also be morally appropriate for a physician to terminate the
life of a patient in this sort of context, if humane reasons exist to
warrant the termination.
Tl.'e bare difference between k illing and letting die does not, in itself, make
a moral difference. If a doctor lets a patient die , for humane reasons, he is in
the same position as if he had given a patient a lethal injection for humane
reasons. If his decision was wrong - if, for example the patient's illness was
in fact curable - his decision would be equally regrettable no matter what
method was used to carry it out. And if the doctor's decision was the right
one, the method used in itself is not important. 4

The argument of James Rachel is, I believe, generally recognized to
be the strongest defense for the position made thus far. The core of
Rachel's argument consists in an illustration of the apparent lack of
any significant moral distinction between "allowing a person to die"
and "putting a person to death" in two similar cases.5 In the first case
it is stipulated that Smith will gain a large inheritance if his six year
old nephew dies. To facilitate that end, Smith drowns the child while
the latter is taking a bath, and arranges to make what happened look
like an accident. In the second case it is stipulated that Jones will gain
a large inheritance if his six year old nephew dies. To facilitate that
end, Jones intends to drown the child during the latter's bath. When
about to carry out his plan, however, Jones finds that his nephew has
slipped, hit his head on the bathtub, and is already in the process of
drowning. The child, then drowns "accidentally" as Jones watches and
does nothing. In reference to these cases Rachel's argument offers the
following analysis to support his contention that no morally significant distinction exists between "allowing to die" and "putting to
death."
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Now Smith killed t h e child , wh ereas Jones 'merely' let the child die. That is
the only diffe rence betwee n them. Did e ither man b ehave better, from a
moral point of view? If th e differe nce between killing and letting die were in
itsel f a morall y important m atter, one should say that Jones' behavior was
less reprehensible than Smith's. But does one really want to say that? I
think not. 6

Rachel's argument, however, involves some serious problems. Although his cases show that any morally significant distinction between
"allowing to die" and "putting to death" is not apparent in those
situations where the pertinent agent is as guilty for not saving a victim
whose death he intends, as he would have been for killing the victim
outright, the illustration shows no more than that. The apparent lack
of Jistinction in the two cases also might be explained, for example,
by one's overall perception of the following facts in the cases rather
than by any real lack of moral significance between the omission and
the commission: the same intention of the agent to kill the victim in
each case, the same end result in each case - death, and a clear and
significant moral failure in each case - a failure in justice in the killing
case and failure in beneficence in the "not saving" case. Secondly,
Rachel's cases really tell nothing about what moral significance between "allowing to die" and "putting to death " might be revealed in
the context where the physician is acting morally in allowing his
patient to die. In this context the physician is without moral guilt in
letting his patient die, but in Rachel's illustration Jones is morally
guilty for not saving the child from drowning. The fact that Jones was
as guilty for not saving his nephew as he would have been had he
actually killed him tells us nothing about how the direct termination
of life is going to contrast with "allowing to die" in a medical context
. wherein the latter is clearly morally permissible. And, as indicated by
Tom Beauchamp,S a moral distinction between omission and commission may well be shown from this context, since any direct termination of life there removes all possibility of life for the patient, but
withholding or withdrawing life support or terminal disease controlling therapy need not do this, as the Karen Quinlan case clearly shows.
Basis of Second Argument
The second of the arguments advanced to justify the inclusion of
patient termination in patient treatment is based upon the nature and
function of the therapy used to serve the other goals of medicine in
addition to those of preserving health and controlling disease, namely
the goals of alleviating a patient's pain and comforting his suffering.
The signers of "A Plan for Beneficent Euthanasia,"9 for example,
point out that a physician taking the Hippocratic Oath is committed
both to the treatment and cure of disease and to the relief of suffering, and that the physician's primary concern in the terminal stages of
incurable illness should be the relief of suffering. Thus they contend
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that it is cruel and barbarous to require that a person be kept alive
against his will and to deny his pleas for merciful release after the
dignity, beauty, promise, and memory of life have vanished, and the
individual is left to linger on in stages of agony or decay.
As already noted, there is general agreement among ordinary citizens as well as medical professionals that patients can and do exist in
contexts where initiating or continuing life support or terminal disease
controlling therapy will be of no benefit, and may even be harmful.
Unambiguous contexts of this type, for example, might be those
wherein a patient's capacity to continue developing his personal history, or to begin to develop it as in the case of infants, is virtually
rendered permanently impotent by the disease or illness,lO or possibly
by the medication necessary for controlling it. It seems clear that the
goals of me,d icine to preserve health and control disease can no longer
be effectively achieved in these cases. Thus, the only professional and
moral obligation a physician can possibly have in attending to this
kind of patient is to comfort the patient in his suffering and attempt
to alleviate his pain, i.e., the physician's only moral obligation is to
administer a "caring therapy." The question pertinent to the paper
which arises here, then, is this: could a physician morally fulfill his
professional responsibility to care for a terminally ill patient for whom
health-preserving or disease-controlling therapy is no longer warranted
by inducing a lethal agent into that patient's body? I can find no good
logical reason for denying that it could be morally appropriate for a
physician to give a lethal drug dosage to a patient of the type we have
been discussing if the following conditions are present in the patient's
context: 1) the dosage to be administered is necessary for alleviating
intolerable and irreversible pain, 2) administering it is compatible with
the ordinary medical procedures for pain-alleviating therapy (e.g., the
drug administered is a pain-killing drug), 3) the patient concurs,
explicitly or clearly by implication, to the procedure. Termination
made under these conditions would simultaneously serve medicine's
desirable goal of pain-alleviation in a way consistent with normal medical procedures for alleviating pain. Furthermore, termination under
these conditions cannot possibly violate medicine's goals of controlling disease and preserving health, since these goals cannot be achieved
within the context of the patient in question.
Absolute objections to any inclusion of patient termination in
patient treatment, including the rather limited one just suggested, have
been made most often from theological arguments and the empirical
form of the wedge argument. These theological arguments generally
contend that the direct killing of a patient for any reason would
necessarily cause the physician to violate a fundamental relation existing between God and man, in which God alone is understood to have
absolute dominion over innocent human life)2 The empirical form of
the wedge argument generally supports a utilitarian type thesis: any
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inclusion of patient termination in patient treatment would cause
society to weaken its general moral defense against killing and ultimately have the undesirable consequence of encouraging and permitting termination in all sorts of unwarranted cases.
If, for example, rules permitting active killing were introduced, it is not
implausible to suppose that destroying defective unborns (a form of invol·
untary euthanasia) would become a common and accepted practice, that as
population increases occur the aged will even be more neglectable and neg·
lected than they are now , that capital punishment for a wide variety of
crimes would be increasingly tempting, that some doctors would have
appreciably reduced fears of injecting fatal doses whenever it seemed propi·
tious to do so, and that the laws or war against killing would erode in
efficacy even beyond their already abysmal level. 13

Insofar as the objection to any direct killing in a theological argument is defended by a line of reasoning which rests ultimately on a
religious faith belief, as frequently occurs, little damage is done to the
argument for patient termination made above. A theological claim of
this sort may be required of physicians who share the pertinent faith
belief, but it is not, nor should one expect it to be, a compelling claim
for any reasonable physician who simply takes morality seriously. Furthermore, in regard to the type of theological objection to direct
termination which rests on purely philosophical argumentation, the
history of philosophy shows rather clearly the difficulty one encounters in attempting to delineate through reason alone the precise relationship which obtains between human creatures and their Creator. To
my knowledge, no compelling philosophical argument of this kind has
been developed that any reasonable physician could be expected to
accept (i.e., who, in not accepting the argument, would necessarily be
either stupid or ill-willed).
Turning now to the empirical form of the wedge argument, one
difficulty with it is that its objections to any patient termination often
lack sufficient empirical evidence to be convincing. The horrendous
genocide resulting from the national euthanasia policy of Nazi Germany is, for example, the most significant piece of empirical evidence
many recent wedge arguments use in making their objection; but does
that evidence really indicate what unwarranted liberties with human
life a physician functioning in a civilized society would take, if it were
admitted that the termination of a patient's life in the process of
pain-alleviating therapy could be morally permissible?
Difficulty with Wedge Objections
A second and related difficulty with wedge argument objections is
that they are often based, at least partially, upon gratuitous assumptions about how the perverse tendencies in human beings will become
unleashed if patient termination is considered moral. In defending his
objection Joseph Sullivan, for example, states that "once the respect
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for human life is so low that an innocent person may be killed directly
even at his own request, compulsory euthanasia will necessarily be
very near." 14 The text from Tom Beauchamp's study cited previously
in the paper is also full of gratuitous assumptions of this kind. The
critical issue here then is why anyone inclined to favor the inclusion of
patient termination in patient treatment should take seriously any
objections to that leaning based upon gratuitous assumptions. Moreover, are there really any substantive reasons for believing that physicians would unjustly kill their patients, were patient termination
deemed morally acceptable in the process of pain-alleviating therapy,
any more than they currently unjustly withhold life support or disease-controlling treatment from their patients? No doubt some injustice exists in current practices of withholding and withdrawing, especially in cases involving infants, but few people advocate correcting
this abuse by eliminating the permissibility of withholding and withdrawing in patient treatment. Even if it is true, as some ethicians
suggest,15 that no form of patient termination should be sanctioned
at this time, either in law or in professional medical codes of ethics,
because of the possible harm that might result, it does not deny the
theoretical point established previously: a physician could be acting
morally in inducing a lethal agent into a terminally ill patient's body
during the process of caring therapy, when that is the only form of
patient treatment warranted in the context.16 Nevertheless, this
theoretical point may in itself have little practical relevance for patient
treatment. Medical institutions dedicated to serving terminally ill
patients, such as the famous St. Christopher's Hospice in London,
England, seem to be able to administer caring therapy to their dying
patients in a satisfactory manner without being required to terminate
their lives. In fact, Cicely Saunders, an internationally respected physician and director of St. Christopher's, reports that "in treating patients much pain can be relieved without resorting to analgesics at
all." 17
Yet, if the argument for patient termination in the context of painalleviating therapy is theoretically substantive, it does raise the interesting query of whether justification for patient termination in patient
treatment can be made in contexts other than the one involving painalleviating therapy. 18 It can be readily denied, I believe, that any other
justification for patient termination can be made in any context
involving conscious patients. Since the goals of medicine properly
direct physicians to care for their patients as well as to preserve their
health and control their disease, whenever that is possible and beneficial, physicians would seem to have a professional obligation to continue administering caring therapy to any conscious patient, even
when a patient can no longer benefit from disease-controlling therapy.
An objection to this exclusion made by Daniel Maguire states that
"persons who are quite accessible to human caring might, in spite of
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their accessibility, find good reasons to prefer death to continued
living." 19 In fact, Maguire argues, "the care they might want is assistance in hastening death." 20 If, however, it is true, as Maguire's statement implies, that a physician can no longer have a moral obligation
to continue administering caring therapy to a dying patient who
refuses treatment, although the person is accessible to the therapy, it
must also be true that caring therapy by its nature requires the patient's acceptance in order to exist at all. Thus, the physician cannot
really have any professional obligations to a patient in this context
and, as a physician, cannot have any moral reason or justification for
terminating the person's life. Maguire's contextual position seems to
suggest that the goals of medicine are pragmatic goals, which have
developed in the manner of a typical producer-consumer process. The
history of medicine, however, does not support the suggestion. Medicine's professional goals of preserving health, controlling disease, and
administering care to patients have remained constant throughout
medicine's long history primarily because they relate to important
human goods, and not because they fulfill the wishes or desires of
individual patients, regardless of the value or disvalue that will result
from the fulfillment. 21
The remaining context where additional justification for patient
termination in patient treatment might possibly be made, then, is one
involving a self-respirating but irreversibly comatose patient for whom
disease-controlling therapy is no longer warranted. It seems clear that
some sort of therapy would still be professionally required for any
other comatose patient context, whether the coma is or is not reversible. Can it be morally permissible then, for a physician to inject a
lethal agent into the body of an irreversibly comatose patient who
continues to self-respirate? Prescinding from the absolute injunctions
against any form of patient termination reviewed and evaluated
earlier, perhaps the best reason for answering this question negatively
might be that the person in the comatose context under consideration
continues to be a genuine medical patient; he can be fed, his waste can
be removed and, in addition to other similar things, his bed position
can be changed periodically. Thus no termination can possibly be
warranted for this type of patient because he continues to be a viable
recipient of caring therapy. The plausible objection that can be made
against this line of reasoning, however, is that the self-respirating
comatose individual should not be considered a patient in the strong
sense of the term because he necessarily and permanently is completely indifferent to anything being done to or for him, and some
marginal response or realistic hope of a marginal response from the
patient is necessary for caring therapy to exist at all. How, for
example, can comfort and pain alleviation be administered to a patient
who neither feels pain nor suffers discomfort? In what sense is a
person being treated as a patient if the treatment is administered to his
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biological body alone?22 But if this is true, then it seems that the
self-respirating irreversibly comatose patient is simply beyond receiving patient treatment in any professional sense, and a physician would
have no more moral justification for terminating the life of this kind
of person than he has for terminating the life of the conscious patient
discussed earlier in the paper who is accessible to caring therapy, but
desires termination instead.
If the arguments in the paper are substantive then a physician could
act morally when injecting a lethal dosage of a pain-alleviating drug
into a terminally ill patient's body during the process of caring therapy. This allowance, however, would seem to have little practical significance for the actual practice of patient treatment, since pain generally appears to be controllable in caring therapy without requiring
lethal drug dosages. Patient termination then, is not necessarily incompatible with patient treatment, but it virtually continues to be unwarranted in medical practice.
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